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Abstract
A puzzling feature of the UK labour market is that there is not enough investment in job training
(either by workers or by rms) while there is a high skill premium. We model this as a two sector
(skilled and unskilled) economy with a non-cooperative training game between vacant skilled rms
and unemployed unskilled workers. A vacant skilled rm has an incentive to train an unskilled worker
because of the chance of a better match with a skilled worker. On the other hand, an unskilled worker
has an incentive to train because it could increase his lifetime earning. Using a social planning problem
as a baseline, the paper demonstrates that while it is socially optimal to invest in job training, the
private sector may fail to internalize these benets in a wide range of economies. Calibrating the
model for the UK economy, we compute the welfare gain due to the institution of job training in
various environments. The welfare gain from a training programme is highest if workers instead of
rms bear the cost of training. The model also predicts that while the skill gap decreases, the income
inequality could rise when a job training programme is in place.
1 Introduction
A striking feature of the UK labour market is the simultaneous presence of a staggering skill premium
between high and low skilled jobs and underinvestment in job training. Since 1986, more jobs require
advanced skill. According to Felstead et al. (2002), a substantial skill premium exists at the graduate
level (57% for women and 38% for men) compared with jobs which require no qualication. Felstead
et al. (2002) also document that there is a shortage of high-skilled workers (level 4) while there is an
excess supply of workers with intermediate skills and low skills (levels 3 and 2).1
On the other hand, there is little evidence of worker participation in training. Schömann and Siarov
(2005) provide evidence of low worker participation of training in the European union. Although
there was a steady increase in training participation (about 2.5%) over the period 1995-2003, it
signicantly falls short of the Lisbon target of 15%. They also observe a remarkable disparity in
training participation of low and high skilled workers. Participation rate of low skilled workers in a
training programme is 13% less than high skilled workers.
These ndings are puzzling. If there is such a high skill premium, why is this not exploited
by the workers and rms? If a large number of skilled, well paid jobs are vacant, one expects that
workers would invest in job training and reap the benets. Instead, workers are content to acquire
lesser intermediate qualications in the labour market. Low skilled workers hardly undertake any
investment in training to upgrade their skills. There is also little evidence that skilled rms train
unskilled workers while skill shortages are persistent. The recent interim review of the UK Commission
for Employment and Skills (2010) points out the importance of demand and supply of high skilled
workers in the UK economy. This survey raises the question how demand and supply of skilled workers
could be an interdependent phenomenon. An economy could be trapped in a low level equilibrium
with low demand for skilled workers as well as a low supply simply because there may not be enough
incentive for investment in skill enhancement.2 The bottom-line is that a high skill premium coexists
with a glaring underinvestment in training.
The aim of this paper is to understand the reasons for this voluntary underinvestment in training.
1The following quotation from Felstead et al. (2002) aptly summarizes this supply-demand imbalance: "...there are
6.4 million people qualied to the equivalent of NVQ level 3 in the workforce, but only 4 million jobs that demand this
level of highest qualication. There are a further 5.3 million people qualied at level 2, but only 3.9 million jobs that
require a highest qualication at this lower level.
2Haskel and Martin (2001) document that the skill shortage is greater for rms employing advanced technology.
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We propose the hypothesis that the underinvestment in training may happen in a strategic environment
where workers and rms may simply fail to internalize the social benets of training. The job training
decision is modelled as a dynamic game between workers and rms where there are search frictions of
nding the right match of vacancy with skill. In our model, only two active agents have the potential
to invest in training. These are, namely a skilled rm which has a job vacancy and an unskilled
worker who does not presently have a job. These economic agents cannot simultaneously invest in
training and continue to work/produce because of the indivisibility of time. There are several passive
agents such as skilled and unskilled employed workers and skilled engaged rms who do not actively
invest in training. However, they experience the externality from a job training programme because
it impacts the skilled-unskilled wage di¤erential.
Both these active agents have incentive as well as disincentive to invest in training. A vacant
skilled rm has an incentive to recruit an unskilled unemployed worker and train him because in
this way it can increase its chance of being engaged and avoid the cost of keeping a position vacant.
An unemployed unskilled worker has an incentive to engage in job training because by doing so it
can increase the likelihood of nding a skilled job and improve his life time earning prole. The
disincentive for training for both these rms and workers arises for strategic reasons. If the training
cost exceeds certain threshold, an unskilled unemployed worker may rather wait for a match with a
skilled vacant rm who will select him for a job training programme. Likewise, a vacant skilled rm
may not train any worker and keep the position vacant if the training cost exceeds its own threshold
level. This strategic interdependence may give rise to an ine¢ cient Cournot-Nash equilibrium where
none may invest in training for a range of training costs.
The equilibrium where neither party invests in job training programme is deemed to be privately
optimal but not socially optimal. This discrepancy between private and social values arises simply
because of an externality. Workers or rms in isolation fail to internalize the social benets of upgrading
skills through a job training programme. If such a discrepancy between social and private values arises,
we call it a coordination failurein the actions of rms and workers.
We formally characterize this coordination failure by setting up a ctitious social planning problem
where the benevolent social planner internalizes the search frictions, costs of vacancy and the value of
leisure. The planner then dictates whether rms or households should invest in job training and if so,
how much training cost each party should bear. Given this social planning model as the baseline, we
ask whether there is enough incentive for the private sector to invest in such a training programme.
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Based on the UK and OECD studies, we calibrate the model specic parameters and compute
welfare gain due to the institution of a job training in various environments. The welfare gain from
job training programme is highest in a command economy where the social planner internalizes all
the private costs and benets of training. In a decentralized economy, magnitude of this welfare gain
depends on who adopts training. The overall welfare gain is higher in a private economy if instead
of rms, unskilled workers bear the cost of training. For our calibrated economy the overall welfare
gain from job training can range from 7 to 10%. The welfare gain could be higher if skilled rms
are subsidized by the government or the unemployment benet is reduced for the workers making
leisure expensive to them. We also nd that the income inequality could rise when a job training
programme is in place. This happens primarily because a job training programme increases the
skilled unemployment in our model because number of skilled rms do not change but number of
skilled workers increase.
Our model contributes to a long standing literature on nancing of training that started from the
seminal work of Becker (1965). Becker pointed out that in a competitive labour market environment
rms have no incentive to provide general training to workers as this training is fully transferrable to
other rms. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) and Stevens (1994) argue that when rms have labour
market power, they may reap some benets from investing in general training. Since skilled workers
face worse outside options, wage structure becomes compressed.
In our model, if rms invest in training, all skilled rms are worse o¤ and all skilled workers benet.
On other hand, if workers invest in training both parties are better o¤. When vacant rms invest in
training, the trained worker enjoys a bargaining advantage to strike a higher wage because the rm
has already borne the sunk cost of training him. This raises the wage cost and consequently lowers
the prot of all skilled rms in the economy. This explains why all skilled rms are worse o¤ when a
vacant skilled rm invests in training. On the other hand, if an unskilled worker invests in training, he
does not gain any such bargaining strength because he just acquires the same level of skill as a born
skilled worker. Our calibration experiment with UK data suggests that skilled rms can lose about
23% of welfare when rms invest in training while they will gain by 11% if workers invest in training.
The overall gain in welfare for all parties is 4% higher when instead of rms, workers bear the cost of
training.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we lay out the environment and set up
a model of strategic job training. Section 3 describes the social planning model. Section 4 reports
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the quantitative analysis of the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Two types of technologies are available: high-skill (su¢ xed as s) and low-skill (su¢ xed as u). Each of
these technologies could produce ps and pu units of output if it is operated by a skilled and unskilled
worker respectively. The skilled sector has a higher productivity which means ps > pu: There are
continuum of such skilled and unskilled workers and rms in a unit interval. Initially there are sw0
proportion of skilled workers and sf0 rms. There is also an initial distribution of vacant skilled and
unskilled rms denoted as vs00 and v
u
00 respectively and an initial distribution of unemployed skilled
and unskilled workers denoted as us00 and u
u
00 respectively.
There are two types of provisions for job training in the economy: (i) unskilled unemployed worker
undertakes self-training by joining a skill center, and (ii) vacant skilled rm imparts job training to
an unskilled worker. In both cases, an unskilled worker turns skilled in the next period. The only
decision problem for either the unskilled unemployed worker or the skilled vacant rm is whether
to invest resources in job training.3 Such a decision is represented by an indicator function wt ; 
f
t
respectively taking on values 0 or 1 for no training and training for worker and rm respectively.
Vacant rms and unemployed workers randomly match. At each date, uit proportion of unemployed
i -type workers meet vjt (j = s; u) proportion of vacant rms. Let 
ij be the probability that such a
match consummates. The matching function is thus given by: 4
M ijt = 
ijuitv
j
t (2.1)
Based on the technology and the provisions of job training, three types of matching are conceivable:
(i) a high skilled worker successfully matches a vacant high skilled rm, and produces output ps; (ii)
a low skilled worker successfully matches a vacant low skilled rm and produces pu , (iii) a low skilled
worker successfully matches a vacant high skilled rm and this vacant rm decides to train this worker
3Since the focus of this paper is on job training, for simplicity we rule out the possibility of technology upgrade by
unskilled rms to turn skilled.
4This matching function is known in the literature as a quadratic matching function following Diamond and Maskin
(1979). Such a matching function can be motivated by the illustrative example borrowed from Mortensen and Pissarides
(1998) that both matched and unmatched rms and households have a telephone book of all matched and unmatched
agents on the other end of the market. A quadratic matching function may give rise to multiple equilibria. In our
context, we break such multiplicity by invoking an initial distribution of skilled and unskilled workers and rms.
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by incurring a training cost. Each period a xed fraction i of existing matches in the skilled and
unskilled sector die due to exogenous retirement or layo¤s.
Let ift and 
iw
t be the number of the i-th type rms and workers respectively.
4ust = s(swt   ust )  ssustvst + wt uut vst (1  ss) (2.2)
4uut = u(uwt   uut )  uuuut vut   wt uut   ft usuut vst (2.3)
4vst = s(sft   vst )  ssustvst   ft usuut vst (2.4)
4vut = u(uft   vut )   uuuut vut (2.5)
4swt = wt uut + ft usuut vst (2.6)
4sft = 0 (2.7)
A few clarication of the terms in the transition equations are in order. The transition equation
(2.2) shows that the number of skilled unemployed increases when job separations occur (rst term)
or unemployed unskilled worker meets a vacant skilled rm after completing self-training in a skill
center but the match does not consummate (third term). On the other hand, the number of high
skilled unemployed decreases if a vacant skilled rm meets a high skilled worker and the match is
successful (second term). Similar explanation applies to the rst two terms of (2.3). The third term of
(2.3) reects the fact that the number of unskilled unemployed workers decreases when an unskilled
worker joins the skill center, thus withdraws from the pool of unskilled unemployed and joins the pool
of skilled unemployed. The fourth term means that when an unskilled worker meets a skilled vacant
rm and the match consummates the number of low skilled unemployed workers decreases.
The transition equation (2.4) for the vacant skilled rms shows that the number of vacant rms
increases when a job separation occurs (rst term). The number of vacant rms decreases when a
vacant skilled rm successfully matches with an unemployed skilled worker or when a vacant skilled
rm successfully matches with a low skilled worker (third term). The transition equation (2.5) for
vacant unskilled rms is self-evident.
The transition equation for the skilled workers (2.6) means that more skilled workers evolve as more
unskilled workers invest in job training (the rst term) or more skilled rms invest in job training (the
second term). The transition equation (2.7) reects that the number of high skilled rms is constant
over time.
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We focus on the steady state analysis only. There are four possible steady states for this system:
(i) rms invest in training while workers do not, ft = 1; 
w
t = 0;(ii) rms do not invest in training but
workers do, ft = 0; 
w
t = 1 , (iii) both invest in training, 
f
t = 1; 
w
t = 1; (iv) none invest in training,
ft = 0; 
w
t = 0: Dene the set of steady states in training as  = f10; 01; 11; 00g where the rst
element of each tuple is the training state of the rm, ft and the second is the same of the worker,
wt : Let  stand for an element of the set :
In the following lemma, we prove that if at least one party invests in job training, all unskilled
workers turn skilled and all unskilled jobs remain vacant.
Lemma 1 The states where at least one of the agents invest in education (meaning  6= 00) the stable
steady state solutions of the transition equations are given by
1. uu = 0; v
u
 = 
uf
0 ;
2. sw = 1; 
uw
 = 0;
3. sf = 
sf
0 = 1  uf ;
4. us = u
s  12
 h

s   ss
i
+
rh

s   ss
i2
+ 4ss
!
and
5. vs = v
s  us   s
where ss = 
s
ss and 
s
= 1  sf0 :
Proof : Appendix 1.
If at least one person invests in training, unskilled workers disappear in the economy. This
means that the unemployment rate for unskilled workers goes to zero and all unskilled rms remain
vacant. This explains the results (1), (2) and (3) of Lemma 1. On the other hand, there is still some
natural rate of unemployment and vacancy in the skilled sector due to matching frictions which are
characterized in results (4) and (5). Result (5) states that after training, the number of active skilled
rms sf0   vs exactly balances the number employed skilled workers (1  us):
When nobody invests in training, the number of high skilled and low skilled workers do not change
from its initial level. The following lemma formalizes it.
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Lemma 2 : The state where no-one invests (meaning  = 00) the stable steady state solutions of
the transition equations are given by
iw = iw0 ;
iw = iw0 (2.8)
ui00 =
1
2

i0   ii

+
q
i0   ii
2
+ 4iiiw0

(2.9)
vi00 = u
i
00   i0 (2.10)
where i0 = 
iw
0   if0 and ii = 
i
ii
; i = u; s:
Proof of Lemma:. Appendix 1.
Lemmas (1) and (2), enable us to reduce the number of states to two, namely: (i) state of no
training and (ii) state of training. Dene
  1   1  f (1  w) = 1 if at least one party invests in training
= 0 otherwise
: (2.11)
Then the vacancy and unemployment rates in each sector can be rewritten in a compact form as:
vi =
 
1   vi00 + vi ; i = u; s (2.12)
ui =
 
1  ui00 + ui; i = u; s (2.13)
When at least one party invests in training, it also increases unemployment rate in the skilled
sector because the number of skilled rms do not change while the number of skilled workers increase.
Since there are more unemployed skilled workers, the probability of a skilled vacant rm matching
with a skilled worker also increases. Consequently skill gap also decreases. This gives rise to an
incentive for the skilled rms to invest in training. We have the following corollary summarizing these
results.
Corollary 1 : a) The probability of matching with a skilled worker is higher in the state of training
ssus00 < 
ssus:
b) The skill gap decreases in the state of training
if0   iw0 > if0   1
Proof. Appendix 1.
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3 Strategic Job Training
We now turn our attention to a decentralized environment where the job training decisions are made in
a noncooperative, strategic environment. Let sc be the cost for training a worker. Let b be a common
leisure value of any unemployed worker of any type, c be a common cost of keeping a production unit
vacant and !i be the wage prevailing in the i-th sector. Unskilled workers while deciding to incur
training costs take into account that even if they do not incur this cost, there is a chance of being
hired by a skilled rm and getting trained subsequently. A skilled rm while contemplating to train
an unskilled worker internalizes the fact that the same worker may leave the rm after training. The
job training thus appears as an equilibrium outcome of a dynamic game between workers and rms
in a search environment.
There are eight types of agents in our economy: (i) unskilled employed and unemployed workers,
(ii) skilled employed and unemployed workers, (iii) vacant skilled and unskilled rms, (iv) active skilled
and unskilled rms. Dene the value functions of these eight types as: Eu, Uu; Es; U s; V s; V u; Js; Ju
respectively. Among these eight types, only unskilled unemployed workers and vacant skilled rms
can invest in job training and are thus deemed as active players in training decisions. The remaining
six agents are passive in the sense that they do not involve in job training. It is assumed that all
engaged skilled and employed unskilled workers use a xed amount of time for production. This time
is indivisible in the sense that it cannot be divided between production and investment in training.
This explains why all engaged skilled rms and employed unskilled workers cannot invest in training.
Since we rule out the possibility of a technological upgrade by an engaged unskilled rm, it is not
worthwhile for such a rm to invest in job training. Nevertheless, these passive agents experience
externality from the training decisions of the active agents because skilled wages are inuenced by
training. The steady state value functions of these passive agents thus depend on the Nash equilibrium
arising from the strategic training decisions of unskilled unemployed worker and vacant skilled rms.
To see this clearly, let us rst spell out Uu and V s:
3.1 Value Functions of the Active Players
The only initial state of interest here is the state of no training because otherwise the mass of unskilled
workers goes to zero by virtue of Lemma 1. An unskilled unemployed worker collects unemployment
benet at present and faces two choices: train himself or not to train himself. If he goes for self-
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training, there are two prospects: (i) the prospect of being matched with a vacant skilled rm with
probability ssvu or (ii) the prospect of no such match with either skilled or unskilled rm. If he
does not go for self-training, three possibilities lend themselves: (a) he can be matched with either
a vacant unskilled rm with probability  uuvu ; (b) he could remain unemployed with a prospect of
being matched with a vacant skilled rm who may impart training to him with a probability  usvs;
(c) he may simply remain unemployed without any match whatsoever. If he indeed matches with
a vacant skilled rm who imparts training to him, during the training period he does not produce
anything or does not receive any wages. During this training state, his status is thus deemed to be
unskilled unemployed.
The value function of an unskilled worker is thus given by:
Uu

f ; w

= b  wsc+ w [ssvsEs + (1  ssvs)U s] +
(1  w)
24  uuvuEu +  usvsUu( f ; w
+(1   uuvu    usvs)Uu
 
f ; w

35 (3.14)
where w = argmaxw Uu
 
f ; w

:
Next consider the formulation of V s. A vacant skilled rm currently incurs the sunk cost c of
keeping its unit vacant and also a possible training cost depending on whether it decides to train an
unskilled worker. If it decides to train, the same trained worker turns skilled and the relationship
can endure with a probability ssus which means that the vacant skilled rm turns active with the
trained skilled worker. If the matching does not work out, the vacant skilled rm remains inactive
with complement probability (1  ssus). On the other hand, if the skilled vacant rm does not
spend on training, there is still a chance of a match with a skilled worker with probability ssus: The
value function of the vacant skilled rm is thus given by:
V s

f; w

=  c  fsc+ f
h
ssusJ
s + (1  ssus)V s

f; w
i
(3.15)
+

1  f


h
ssusJ
s + (1  ssus)V s

f; w
i
=  c  fsc+ 
h
ssusJ
s + (1  ssus)V s

f; w
i
where f = argmaxf V
s
 
f ; w

. It is important to observe that the skilled vacancy rate vs and
the unemployment rate us depend on the state of training via (2.12) and (2.13).
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3.2 Value Functions of the Passive Agents
We next formulate the value functions of the remaining six types of agents who are deemed as passive
since they do not undertake any training decisions. However, each of their values depends on the
training decisions f and w of skilled vacant rms and unskilled unemployed workers through the
vacancy and unemployment rate vi and u
i
 (in (2.12) and (2.13)) and wages which will be specied in
the next section. As all these passive agents do not involve in training decision, we do not hereafter
write the values of these agents as functions of f and w.
A skilled employed worker can earn a wage !s today and faces two scenarios: (i) stay employed in
the next period with a probability (1 s) or (ii) join the pool of skilled unemployed with probability
s: A skilled unemployed worker collects unemployment benets, b today and faces the prospect of
being matched with a vacant skilled rm with probability ssvs00 when there is no investment in
training and with probability ssvs when there is investment in training.5 Thus, the value functions
of skilled employed and unemployed are given by:
Es = !s +  [sU s + (1  s)Es] (3.16)
U s = b+  [ssvsE
s + (1  ssvs)U s] (3.17)
Likewise an unskilled employed worker has the following value function:
Eu = !u +  [uUu + (1  u)Eu] (3.18)
An active unskilled rm produces pu and after paying wage !u to the worker and faces two prospects
next period: (i) stay active with a probability (1   u) or (ii) join the pool of vacant unskilled rms
with a probability u: An inactive (vacant) unskilled rm incurs the vacancy cost c and faces the
prospect of being matched with an unemployed unskilled worker with a probability  uuuu or stay
vacant with a probability (1   uuuu). The value functions for the unskilled rms are thus given by:
Ju = pu   !u +  [uV u + (1  u)Ju] (3.19)
V u =  c+  [ uuuuJu + (1   uuuu)V u] (3.20)
Likewise an active skilled rm has a value function:
Js = ps   !s + [(1  s)Js + sV s] (3.21)
5 It is assumed that skilled unemployed worker does not search for a job in the unskilled sector.
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Wage Determination
The wage in each sector is determined by a Nash bargaining:
!s

f; w

= argmax
!s
(Es   U s)

Js   V s

f; w
1 
and (3.22)
!u

f; w

= argmax
!u

Eu   Uu

f; w

(Ju   V u)1  (3.23)
respectively where  is a non-negative fraction representing the bargaining strength of the worker and 
f; w

are equilibrium strategies. The Nash bargaining wage is basically the weighted average of
the ow excess return of the rm from employing a worker vis-a-vis keeping the position vacant and
the ow excess return of the worker taking a job vis-a-vis staying unemployed. In addition, the wage
also depends on the state of training. We have an important result.
Lemma 3 Skilled wage is higher in the state when rms undertake training compared to the state
where workers undertake training,
!s (1; 0) > !s (0; 1) : (3.24)
Proof. Appendix. 2
A vacant skilled rm in our model becomes engaged by bearing the sunk cost of training an
unskilled worker. Since it has already borne this cost, it is incentive compatible for the rm to
keep the worker paying a higher wage to keep this worker. On the other hand, when an unskilled
unemployed bears the cost of training, he just acquires the same level of skill as a born skilled worker.
This means that he cannot strike a higher wage bargain and shift the cost of training to the employer.
This explains why skilled wage is higher when rms invest in training.
Characterization of Equilibrium
We now dene formally a Nash equilibrium for our economy which reects the interdependence of
workers and rms through the training decisions of the active players.
Denition: Given the initial state of no training and a training cost of sc; a Nash equilibrium in
training satises the following conditions:
(i) An unskilled unemployed worker chooses the training decision w optimally taking the training
decision (f ) of the vacant skilled rm as given. In other words, Uu
 
f; w
  Uu  f; w
(ii) A vacant skilled rm chooses the training decision f optimally taking the training decision
(w) of the unskilled worker as given. In other words, V s
 
f; w
  V s  f ; w :
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(iii) Given the training decisions of unskilled workers and vacant skilled rms, other workers behave
optimally and solve (3.16), (3.17), (3.18).
(iv) Given the training decisions of unskilled workers and vacant skilled rms, other rms behave
optimally and solve (3.19), (3.20) and (3.21).
(v) Given the optimal training decisions of workers and rms, wages are determined by Nash
bargaining as in (3.22) and (3.23).
Depending on the schooling cost, various equilibria are possible where either the rm or worker
may or may not choose to invest in training. We are particularly interested in a Nash equilibrium
where none may invest in training while it is socially optimal that at least someone invests in training.
Such a scenario is deemed to be a coordination failure among agents because private agents do not
internalize certain social benets of training. To understand the nature of this coordination failure,
we proceed in two steps. First, we characterize the range of schooling costs for which there is a Nash
equilibrium in no training. Second, we set up a social planning problem where the ctitious social
planner internalizes all the benets and costs of training and show the conditions under which it is
socially optimal to invest in training but not privately optimal.
3.3 Coordination Failure in Training: No Training Equilibrium
Given the initial state of no training and a training cost of sc; a Nash equilibrium where nobody
invests in training satises the following two conditions:
1. Given that rms do not bear training cost, workers will not pay if
Uu (0; 1) < Uu (0; 0) : (3.25)
2. Given that workers do not pay, a vacant skilled rm will not incur the training cost if
V s (1; 0) < V s (0; 0) : (3.26)
Since Uu (0; 1) and V s (1; 0) are monotonically decreasing in sc; there exists a threshold training
cost scnw for which (3.25) holds as equality.6 The worker does not pay for training when the rm does
not pay if
sc > scnw (3.27)
6From (A20) it is obvious @U
u(0;1)
@sc
=  1 and from (A19) @V s(1;0)
@sc
=   1
1 

1  ssus
1 (1 u ssus)

< 0; which
establishes the monotonicity of Uu (0; 1) and V s (1; 0).
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Likewise, there exists a threshold schooling cost scnf for which (3.26) holds as equality. Given that
the worker does not pay, the rm does not pay for training if
sc > scnf (3.28)
Appendix 2 provides an algebraic derivation of these two thresholds.
Based on the above analysis we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If the training cost per pupil is such that
sc > max(scnw ; sc
n
f ) = sc
n(say) (3.29)
neither vacant skilled rm nor the unemployed unskilled worker nds it worthwhile investing in train-
ing.
4 Socially Optimal Training
We next turn to a social planning problem where the social planner internalizes the costs and benets
of training. The planner mandates whether a rm or a worker should spend on job training while
internalizing the benets and costs of keeping workers unemployed and positions vacant. We focus
on steady states only. The social planner takes the steady state congurations of the relevant state
variables, ust ; u
u
t , v
s
t ; v
u
t ; 
sw
t ; 
sf
t as given. Recall from Lemma 1 and 2 that the steady states of the
economy are entirely dependent on the state of training, 7.
Since the steady state values of these state variables are also functions of ij and i, the social
planner internalizes the search frictions while reaching a decision about job training. There are four
possible states of training for  2 . The only relevant initial steady state is when there is no past
investment in training (meaning  = 00) because we know from Lemma 1 that otherwise everybody
is trained to start with, thus making job training redundant. Starting from this initial state, planner
can mandate four possible actions: (i) no change meaning f = 0; and w = 0; (ii) ask only rms to
invest in training, f = 1; and w = 0, (iii) ask only workers to invest in training, f = 0; and w = 1
and (iv) ask both to invest in training, f = 1; and w = 1. The planner chooses the action that gives
the best societal value.
7 In principle, the entire history of training should comprise the current state facing the planner. However, given the
absorbing nature of the state (meaning when either the worker or the rm invests in training, an unskilled worker or rm
turns permanently skilled next period), the current state is thus summarized only by the current state of job training.
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Dene r as the steady state proceeds to the social planner at the state : This can be written as:
r =
X
i=s;u

pi(iw   ui) + bui   cvi

: (4.30)
In other words, the steady state proceeds to the planner is the sum total of outputs from skilled
and unskilled sectors plus the total leisure benets to the skilled and unskilled workers minus the total
vacancy costs of skilled and unskilled units. Note that the social planner internalizes the utility value
of leisure and vacancy costs in the proceeds, r. In contrast, in a decentralized Nash economy, a rm
does not internalize the leisure value of workers and neither does the worker internalize the vacancy
cost of rms.
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Dene r  ps(1  us) + bus   c(vs + vu); then r01 = r10 = r11 = r:
Proof. Replacing the values of iw ; u
i
; u
i
; v
i
; in (4.30) for i = u; s and  6= 00; from Lemma 1 gives
the result.
In other words, the social planner is indi¤erent who invests in training. If at least one party
invests in training, the steady state social proceeds from this is given by r which is the skilled sector
output plus benets of skilled unemployed people minus the vacancy costs.
This considerably simplies the social planners problem. Starting from a no training state, if the
social planner decides not to mandate any training programme, the social value is given by r001  where
r00 =
X
i=u;s

pi(iw0   ui00) + (b  c)ui00

If the planner mandates a training programme, the society incurs a training cost, sc:u00 today but
in the next period it lands into a state where everybody is skilled and the social value is r1 
The planner thus initiates a change from no training to positive training if
r00
1    r00   sc:u
u
00 + 
r
1  
which means that
sc:uu00 

1   [r   r00] (4.31)
The planner nds it worthwhile mandating job training if the training cost (left hand side of
(4.31)) exceeds the annuity value of the proceeds di¤erential when the planner initiates a change from
no training to positive training (the right hand side of (4.31)).
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Based on (4.31) it immediately follows that the social planner mandates investment in training if
the schooling cost (sc) is below a certain threshold given by:
sc <

1  
[r   r00]
uu00
= scp(say): (4.32)
Source of Coordination Failure
It follows from (3.29) and (4.32) that for a range of schooling costs, scn < sc < scp it is socially
benecial to institute a job training programme but it is not privately incentive compatible. While
undertaking a social cost benet analysis of training, the planner internalizes the gain in skilled sector
output and the loss of unskilled sector output, the saving of vacancy cost in each sector, the loss of
the workers leisure time as well as the search frictions. In a market economy, rms and workers do
not internalize all these benets and costs in the same way the social planner does. For example,
an unskilled worker does not fully internalize the saving of a skilled rms cost of keeping positions
vacant while deciding about joining a skill centre. Likewise, a vacant rm will not pay attention to
a workers loss of leisure time if they train unskilled workers. This conict of interest is at the very
root of the coordination failure in training. There could be underinvestment in training which is not
socially optimal.8
4.1 Redistributive E¤ects of Training
The social planning problem provides an important lesson that someone should pay for training for
a range of schooling cost? Who should pay for training? The answer is not obvious because who
bears the cost of training has redistributive e¤ects on the values of skilled rms and workers. The
next proposition makes it clear.
Proposition 3 Js(1; 0) < Js(0; 1); V s(1; 0) < V s(0; 1); Es(1; 0) > Es(0; 1); U s(1; 0) > U s(0; 1):
Proof. Appendix.2.
When rms pay for training, skilled wages are higher than a scenario when workers pay for training
for reasons mentioned in Lemma 3, the steady state values of both vacant and engaged skilled rms
8There is a theoretical possibility of overinvestment in training when it is socially undesirable to institute a job
training programme but the private sector incurs this cost anyway. This happens when scp < sc < scn: In our
calibrated model that we report next this case does not arise because scp > scn for empirically plausible parameter
values.
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are thus lower. All skilled workers, on the other hand, experience a higher expected wages and thus
enjoy a gain in their steady state values. All vacant unskilled rms experience no change in their
values because all unskilled workers turn skilled regardless of who pays for training. The overall e¤ect
is that skilled rms lose (gain) and skilled workers gain (lose) when rms (workers) invest in training.
The aggregate welfare e¤ects of training should take into account this redistributive e¤ects of
welfare. In the next section we turn to a calibration of our model to quantify the welfare e¤ect of
instituting training in the economy.
5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we report a quantitative estimate of the welfare loss due to private underinvestment
in training. There are three steps of this exercise. First, based on the available studies and model
steady state properties, we compute the baseline estimates for our structural parameters of the model.
Second, based on these baseline parameter values, we compute the schooling cost thresholds for the
social planner and the private sector, namely scp; scnf ; sc
n
w : Finally, using these calibrated cost
thresholds, we compute the welfare e¤ects of training.
5.1 Fixing parameter values
There are 12 structural parameters, namely
n
ws0 ; 
fs
0 ; p
s; pu; b; c; ; s; u; s; u; 
o
characterizing
the economy. Because of the stylized nature of the model, it is di¢ cult to nd estimates from existing
studies for all these 12 parameters for the UK economy within a common timeframe. Since we are
calibrating the steady state properties of the model, we take the liberty of choosing available estimates
for di¤erent time periods under the assumption that the UK economy is in a steady state equilibrium.
We also assume that the steady state properties of the UK economy are similar to advanced OECD
countries. This justies the selection of OECD estimates for a few model parameters in the absence
of any suitable UK estimate.
The estimate of  is 0.99 as in Shimmer (2005). We assume that the job separation rates in skilled
and unskilled sector are the same and set it at 0.1 as in Shimmer.
As there are four steady states in the model, (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), (1,1), the issue arises which steady
state should be used for baseline calibration. Since the goal of the paper is to understand the reasons
for the failure of job training, the relevant baseline steady state is chosen to be (0,0) which is the state
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of no training.
According to Nickell and Bell (1994), for UK the proportion of labour force in the skilled sector is
36.8% and in the unskilled sector, it is 28.2% . The remaining labour force is called non-employment
which includes discouraged unskilled workers. Since in our model we only have skilled and unskilled
workers in the labour force, we normalize Nickell and Bell estimates to arrive at the proportion of
skilled and unskilled workers in the labour force. This means that ws0 =36.8%/(36.8%+28.2%) and
wu0 = 1  ws0 :
The unemployment benet parameter b is proxied by the value of leisure time taken from Shimer
(2005) and is xed at 0.4. Using the same study, we x the cost of vacancy, c and the bargaining
parameter,  at 0.21 and 0.72 respectively. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2000) compute the value added
per worker in low, medium and high skilled sectors in rich and poor countries. The ratio of the value
added per worker in high to low skilled sectors is about 2.12 for both rich and poor countries. Based
on their study ps=pu is thus xed at 2.12.
The remaining parameters are sf0 ; 
uf
0 ; 
ss; uu; usare calculated using the steady state properties
of the model. Without any loss of generality, for the purpose of calibration we assume that  us =  uu
which means that the probability of an unskilled worker meeting a skilled vacant rm is the same as
the probability of an unskilled worker meeting an unskilled rm.
We need four steady equations to solve for sf0 ; 
uf
0 ; 
ss; uu: The labour market clearing conditions
in the skilled and unskilled sectors (Lemma 2) imply that ,
iw0   ui00 = if0   vi00; i = u; s (5.33)
From Lemma (2) we get:
ii = i
iw   ui00
ui00
2   iui00 ; i = u; s (5.34)
Given the estimates of the unemployment and vacancy rates us00; u
u
00; v
s
00; v
u
00, our four equations in
(5.33) and (5.34) can be solved for sf0 ; 
uf
0 ; 
ss; uu: Estimates of us00; u
u
00 came from Nickell and Bell
(1994). They estimate these unemployment rates for two levels of education, low education and high
education as discussed earlier for two years 1973 and 1991. We use their estimates for the relatively
recent year 1991 and normalize these by the proportion of workers in the labour force in each group
to arrive at our estimates of us00 and u
u
00. Doing so, we obtain, u
s
00 = 8:92% and u
u
00 = 24:15%:
Regarding the calibration of vacancy rates vs00; v
u
00, observe from the market clearing condition
(5.33) that
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us00 + u
u
00 = v
s
00 + v
u
00 (5.35)
Our calibrated vacancy rates must respect this vacancy-unemployment identity (5.35). To this
end, we use the O¢ ce of National Statistics (ONS) database to get some prior estimates of vs00; v
u
00: We
call these estimates vs;ONS00 and v
u;ONS
00 . ONS provides the vacancies per 100 jobs for 19 occupations.
We select 9 of these occupations as skilled. The remaining occupations are classied as unskilled.9
Evidently this classication of occupations among skilled and unskilled is a bit arbitrary. Our
motivation for this classication is to remain consistent with the classication of Nicole and Bell
among low and high education workers. We basically work on the assumption that 9 jobs selected as
skilled require some form of formal education.
Using these ONS estimates, we normalize vs00; v
u
00 as follows:
vs00 =
vs;ONS00
vs;ONS00 + v
u;ONS
00
(us00 + u
u
00)
vu00 =
vu;ONS00
vs;ONS00 + v
u;ONS
00
(us00 + u
u
00)
These normalized estimates for vacancy rates are model consistent and satisfy the identity (5.35).
Table 1 summarizes the baseline parameter values.
[Insert Table 1]
5.2 Welfare E¤ects of Training and Policy Implications
How does investment or lack of investment in training impact the welfare of workers and rms?
Denote the welfare of all workers in the state  as Ww and likewise denote the welfare of all rms as
W f : We thus have:
9Skilled occupations are namely, (i) Real Estate Activities, (ii) Professional, Scientic & Technical, (iii) Admin &
Support Service Activities, (iv) Public Administration & Defence, (v) Education, (vi) Human Health & Social Work,
(vii) Arts, Entertainment & Recreation, (viii) Information and communication, (ix) Finance and Insurance. Unkilled
occupations are: (i) mining and quarrying, (ii) manufacturing, (iii) Electricity and gas supply, (iv) water suppply and
sewage, (v) construction, (vi) wholesale and retail, (viii) transportation and storage, (ix) accommodation, (x) other
services (xi) total services. The last two categories are unspecied occupations. Including these last two in the skilled
category does not change the result signicantly.
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Ww =
X
i=s;u
(iw   ui)Ei + uiU i (5.36)
W f =
X
i=s;u
h
(if   vi)J i + viV i
i
(5.37)
The welfare e¤ect of training depends on who invests in training. We calculate the values of
rms and workers by setting the schooling cost exactly equal to the corresponding training cost
threshold. For example, when rm invests in training we set sc = scnf at which a vacant skilled rm
is just indi¤erent between training or no training. Likewise, when workers invest in training, we set
sc = scnw .
We next turn to the details of the calculations of the welfare e¤ects of training, The training
decision of either rm or worker has spillover e¤ect on the values of all other rms and workers in
the economy through strategic interdependence that impacts the aggregate welfare of all workers and
rms as spelled out in (5.36) and (5.37).
Table 2 summarizes the changes in welfare of rms and workers for the baseline model. When
unskilled worker alone invests in training, both rms and workers gain in welfare by 11% and 3%
respectively. The welfare of the whole economy (denoted as W e = W
w
 + W
f
 ) consisting of all
workers and rms increases by 7%. On the other hand, when a vacant skilled rm alone invests in
training, rms lose by about 21 % and workers gain by 23% while the overall welfare increases by
3%.10
[Insert Table 2]
The estimate of the welfare gain in a command economy reported in the last column of Table
2 is 8%11. Since the social planner internalizes all the private costs and benets, not surprisingly
the welfare gain from the institution of a job programme is higher in a planned economy than in a
10The overall change in welfare is less than 10% because aggregate welfare is the weighted sum of workersand rms
welfare. These weights change with respect to the state of training. These weight are also quite sensitive to training
because due to training all unskilled workers turn skilled.
11The proportional change in the palnners welfare due to institution of training is given by:
W s  W s00
W s00
=
 (r   r00)
r00
= (1  ) sc
puu00
r00
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decentralized economy. Comparison of the last two columns of Table 2 reveals that when workers
undertake a self nanced training programme, the welfare gain in a decentralized economy comes
close to the gain that one observes in a planned economy. On the other hand, the discrepancy
between private and social welfare gains is much higher when rms impart training to workers. This
discrepancy between private and social welfare gain is a measure of e¢ ciency loss in a decentralized
economy due to the coordination failure.
Tables 3 and 4 report the sensitivity analysis of these estimates of welfare gain when two crucial
policy parameters, namely ps=pu and b change. A change in ps=pu raises the welfare gain in a
private economy when either the rm or worker adopts training. The gain is higher when the rm
initiates training. Change in unemployment benet has little e¤ects on the welfare gain from training
regardless of who spends on training.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4]
The upshot of this welfare analysis is that the welfare gain is the maximum if workers are given
incentive to initiate training. The policy implication is that providing training subsidy directly to
workers can induce workers to undertake training. Providing subsidy to skilled rms (that raises
ps=pu) can also help as it results in an overall welfare gain.
5.3 Skill Premium and Income Inequality
In our model, the skill premium (dened as the ratio skilled to unskilled wages, ws00=w
u
00) as shown in
Tables 5 and 6 is about 50% in a state of no voluntary training programme for the baseline parameter
values. This is of the same order of magnitude reported by Felstead et al. (2002) and Nickel and Bell
(1994) A higher skilled:unskilled productivity gap (higher ps=pu) raises the skill premium because the
skilled wage increases more than unskilled wages to reect this productivity di¤erence. On the other
hand, a more liberal unemployment benet (b) lowers the skill premium as evident from (A7) 12. Since
in our stylized model everyone becomes skilled following a job training, trivially the skill premium
disappears after training.
How does a job training impact the income inequality? Tables 7 and 8 compare the Gini
coe¢ cient for economies with no training and positive training. Before the job training, the inequality
is measured across four groups of workers, skilled and unskilled employed earning wages ws00 and w
u
00
12 It is easy to verify that @(w
s
00=w
u
00)
@b
< 0 if ps > pu:
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respectively, skilled and unskilled unemployed collecting unemployment benets b where b < wu00 <
ws00: A job training programme eliminates unskilled workers. The Gini coe¢ cient in a state of no
training is about 0.38, which is similar to the gini coe¢ cient reported by National Statistics (between
0.36 to 0.34).13 . A job training increases this income inequality by 5 to 15% depending on who
pays for training. Increase in inequality is more if rms invest in training rather than workers. This
happens because the wage increase is more when rms invest in training for the reasons described
earlier. Changes in productivity ratio and benets have minor e¤ects on the Lorenz ratio. Figure 1
plots the Lorenz curves for the two states of training setting the parameters at the baseline levels.
[Insert Table 5]
[Insert Table 6]
[Insert Table 7]
[Insert Table 8]
[Insert Figure 1]
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we attempt to explain two apparently conicting stylized facts in the UK labour market.
First, there is an acute skill shortage in the UK economy. High skilled positions remain vacant for
a long time while there is an excess supply of intermediate skills. Second, there exists a substantial
high to low skill premium. There is an unexploited prot opportunity in the high skilled sector while
neither the worker nor the rm appears to take advantage of these through job training. We propose
an explanation of this anomaly in terms of a coordination failure of rms and workers decisions
regarding job training. Our model demonstrates that while it is socially optimal to invest in job
training, the private sector may not internalize this benet. As a result, there could be voluntary
underinvestment in training.
Our model and the quantitative analysis predicts that a job training programme can increase social
welfare and reduce skill gap. The welfare gain is higher if instead of rms, workers bear the cost
of training. In a state of no training, a skill premium of the order of 50% can arise which can be
eliminated by instituting a training programme. A voluntary underinvestment in training thus reects
a state of social ine¢ ciency which a benevolent government can correct by a public policy package such
13See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=332
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as output subsidy to skilled rms and less liberal unemployment benets. A job training programme
without an accompanying skill upgrade of rms could increase skilled unemployment and exacerbate
the income inequality.
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Appendix 1:
Proof of Lemma 1: Solve uw and uf . Using (2.6) and (2.7) we get: If

ft ; 
w
t

6= (0; 0) ; conjecture
a solution uw = 0: Since 0  uu  uw this means uu = 0 as well 14. Also sf = sf0 = 1   uf .
The steady state solutions using (2.5) and (2.3) using the previous solutions we have:
u(uw   uu) = uuuuvu + usuuvs (A1)
u(uf   vu) =  uuuuvu (A2)
implying vu = uf0 :The other solutions satises the (A1) and (A2) as well. Plugging in u
u = 0 in
equation (2.2) and (2.4) we solve for us and vs from as:
s(sw   us) = ssusvs (A3)
s(sf   vs) = ssusvs (A4)
sw   us = sf   vs or vs = us    sw   sf = us   s; where s =  sw   sf is the equilibrium
mismatch between skilled workers and skilled rms. Use (A3) and (A4) to get:
s(sw   us)  ssus [us   s] = 0
us [us   s]  ss(sw   us) = 0
[us]2   (s   ss)us   sssw = 0
where ss = 
s
ss : Then solving the quadratic system we have
us =
1
2

[s   ss] +
q
[s0   s]2 + 4sssw

vs = us   s
Plugging in the values of sw = 1 and sf = sf0 i.e. 
s =

1  sf0

= uf0 we have
us =
1
2
 h
uf0   s
i
+
rh
uf0   ss
i2
+ 4ss
!
vs = us   uf0 :
Proof of Lemma 2: Using 2.7 and 2.6 sf=sf0 and 
sw = sw0 do not change and are given by
initial conditions. Using 2.4 and 2.2 we have hw0  uh = hf0  vh or vh = uh 

hw0   hf0

= uh h0 ;
14There is another solution which is uu = uu0 = 0 and 
sw = sw0 satisfying (2.6). This is unstable since if u
u
0 is
purturbed away from zero sw fails to converge to uw0 , infact it converges to one.
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where h0 is the initial mismatch between skilled workers and skilled rms. We can then solve for u
s
from equation 2.5 and 2.3, (or 2.4 and 2.2) as before
uh =
1
2
h
h0   hh
i
+
q
h0   hh
2
+ 4hhhw0

vh = uh   h0 = vh10:
Proof of Corollary 1: a) Dene function
u (w) =
1
2
 h
w   sf0   
i
+
rh
w   sf0   
i2
+ 4ssw
!
:
Note that u (sw0 ) = u
s
00, u (1) = u
s; and u (w)  0 for 0  w  1: Di¤erentiate u (w) w.r.t. w
and obtain
@u (w)
@w
=
1
2
0BB@1 + 12 2
h
w   sf0   
i
+ 4ssrh
w   sf0   
i2
+ 4ssw
1CCA
=
1
2
rh
w   sf0   
i2
+ 4ssw + 12

w   sf0

+ ssrh
w   sf0   
i2
+ 4ssw
=
u (w) + ssrh
w   sf0   
i2
+ 4ssw
 0
Therefore us = u (1)  u (sw0 ) = us00: Result follows. b) From previous lemmas. 
Appendix 2:
A Derivation of Nash Bargaining Wages
To avoid solving very similar equations for the value functions The following lemma is needed for the
derivation of the value functions, Nash bargaining wages and the derivation of threshold schooling
costs.
Lemma 5 : Dene a set of equations in J; V;E, U and ! with parameters ; ; p; c; b; u; v and 
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as
J = p  ! +  [(1  )J + V ]
V =  c +  [uJ + (1  u)V ]
E = ! +  [U + (1  )E]
U = b+  [vE + (1  v)U ]
! = argmax
!
 log (J   V ) + (1  ) log (E   U)
then the solutions are given by:
! = (1  ) (p+ c) + b
J =
1
(1  )

 c + (p+ c   b)  (1   [1  u])
(1   [1     u])

V =
1
(1  )

 c + (p+ c   b) u
(1   [1     u])

E =
1
(1  )

b+
(p+ c   b) (1  ) (1   [1  v])
(1   [1     v])

U =
1
(1  )

b+
(p+ c   b) (1  )v
(1   [1     v])

:
Proof of Lemma 5: Note that
(1  ) J = p  !    [J   V ]
(1  )V =  c + u [J   V ]
(1  )E = !    [E   U ]
(1  )U = b+ v [E   U ]
then
J =
p  !
(1  )  

(1  ) [J   V ] (A5)
V =
 c
(1  ) +
u
(1  ) [J   V ]
E =
!
(1  )  

(1  ) [E   U ]
U =
b
(1  ) +
v
(1  ) [E   U ]
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Di¤erencing we get,
[J   V ] = p  ! + c
(1  )  
 ( + u)
(1  ) [J   V ]
[E   U ] = !   b
(1  )  
 ( + v)
(1  ) [E   U ]
[J   V ]

1 +
 ( + u)
(1  )

=
p  ! + c
(1  )
[E   U ]

1 +
 ( + v)
(1  )

=
!   b
(1  )
[J   V ] = p  ! + c
(1   [1  ( + u)])
[E   U ] = !   b
(1   [1  ( + v)])
First order conditions from the wage equations give:

p  ! + c =
1  
!   b (A6)
! = (1  ) (p+ c) + b
Replacing the value of ! we have,
[J   V ] =  (p  b+ c)
(1   [1  ( + u)]) and [E   U ] =
(1  ) (p  b+ c)
(1   [1  ( + v)])
Therefore, inserting the value di¤erences in (A5) will give the result. 
Skilled Sector wages:
Proof of Lemma 3: Rewrite the value functions (3.16), (3.17), (3.21), and (3.15) as before. Notice
that from Lemma 5, the wages are independent of u; v and : Therefore the wages in the skilled
sector are given by the parameters p = ps and c =
 
c+ fscf

. Hence
!s = (1  )

ps + c+ fsc

+ b: (A7)
This proves !s(1; 0) > !s(0; 1): 
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Unskilled Sector wages:
The only relevant state for the unskilled sector is the state of no training, i.e.
 
f ; w

= (0; 0) : We
rewrite (3.18), (3.14), (3.19) and (3.20) as:
Eu = !u +  [uUu + (1  u)Eu] (A8)
Uu (0; 0) = b   [ uuvu00Eu + (1   uuvu00)Uu (0; 0)]
Ju = pu   !u +  [uV u + (1  u)Ju] (A9)
V u =  c+  [ uuuu00Ju + (1   uuuu00)V u] (A10)
then using lemma 5 we have,
!u (0; 0) = (1  ) (pu + c) + b:
B Skilled Sector Welfare:
Proof of Proposition 3: Notice that in lemma 5 by plugging in the parameters p = ps; c = 
c+ fscf

, b0 = b,  = s; v = ssvs and u = ssus we get the equations in the skilled sector as
(3.17), (3.16), (3.14), (3.18) and (3.22). We get the skilled sector values when any agent invest as
Es

f ; w

=
1
(1  )
"
b+
 
ps + c+ fscf   b

(1  ) (1   [1  ssvs])
(1   [1  s   ssvs])
#
(A11)
U s

f ; w

=
1
(1  )
"
b+
 
p+ c+ fscf   b

(1  )ssvs
(1   [1  s   ssvs])
#
(A12)
Js

f ; w

=
1
(1  )
"
 

c+ fscf

+
 
p+ c+ fscf   b

 (1   [1  ssus])
(1   [1  s   ssus])
#
(A13)
V s

f ; w

=
1
(1  )
"
 

c+ fscf

+
 
p+ c+ fscf   b

ssus
(1   [1  s   ssus])
#
(A14)
therefore
Es (1; 0)  Es (0; 1) = scf
(1  )

(1  ) (1   [1  ssvs])
(1   [1  s   ssvs])

> 0 (A15)
U s (1; 0)  U s (0; 1) = scf
(1  )

(1  )ssvs
(1   [1  s   ssvs])

> 0 (A16)
Js (1; 0)  Js (0; 1) = scf
(1  )

 1 +  (1   [1  
ssus])
(1   [1  s   ssus])

< 0 (A17)
V s (1; 0)  V s (0; 1) = scf
(1  )

 1 + 
ssus
(1   [1  s   ssus])

< 0 (A18)
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In the unskilled sector the only relevant agent is the vacant unskilled rm whose value is V s (1; 0) =
V s (0; 1) =  c: Since in the state of training there are no unskilled workers are active. 
C Derivation of threshold schooling costs
When
 
f ; w

= (0; 0) from lemma 5 we get:
Uu (0; 0) =
b
1   +
 uuvu00
1  
(1  ) (pu + c  b)
1   [1  u    uuvu00]
V s (0; 0) =   c
1   +
ssus00
1  
 (ps + c  b)
1   (1  s   ssus00)
:
When the rm invests, i.e.
 
f ; w

= (1; 0) from lemma 5 we get:
V s (1; 0) =  c+ sc
1   +
ssus
1  
 (ps + c  b+ sc)
1   (1  u   ssus) : (A19)
When the worker invests, i.e.
 
f ; w

= (0; 1) from lemma 5 and the previous equations we get:
Uu (0; 1) = U s (0; 1)  sc: (A20)
We calculate the threshold Nash-equilibrium cost for the worker by equating Uu (0; 0) = Uu (0; 1)
respectively. Therefore
scnw =
 (1  )
1  

ssvs (ps + c  b)
1   [1  s   ssvs]  
 uuvu00 (p
u + c  b)
1   [1  u    uuvu00]

:
Obtain, Nash-equilibrium cost for the rm by equating and V s (0; 0) = V s (1; 0) ; this implies,
 scnf +


ps + c  b+ scnf

ssus
1   (1  u   ssus) =
 (ps + c  b)ssus00
1   (1  s   ssus00)
ssus
1   (1  u   ssus)   1

scnf = (p
s + c  b)

ssus00
1   (1  s   ssus00)
  
ssus
1   (1  u   ssus)

therefore
scnf = (p
s + c  b) (  00)
(1  ) ; where
 =
ssus
1   (1  u   ssus) and 00 =
ssus00
1   (1  s   ssus00)
:
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
Notation Value Source
 0.99 Shimmer 2005
ws0 0.56 Normalized using Nickell and Bell (1994)
wu0 0.44 Normalized using Nickell and Bell (1994)
us00 0.09 Normalized using Nickell and Bell (1994)
uu00 0.24 Normalized using Nickell and Bell (1994)
vs00 0.17 Normalized using ONS prior
vu00 0.16 Normalized using ONS prior
fs0 0.65 Equation (5.33)
fu0 0.35 Equation (5.33)
s -0.08 = sw0  sf0 =  u
u= s 0.10 Shimmer (2005)
ss 3.01 Equation (5.34)
 uu 0.50 Equation (5.34)
b 0.4 Shimmer 2005
c 0.21 Shimmer 2005
 0.72 Shimmer 2005
ps 2:12 Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2000)
pu 1 Normalized
Table 2: Wefare gain from training evaluated at the baseline parameters
 ps=pu scnp scnw scnf
W f W f00
W f00
Ww  Ww00
Ww00
W e W e00
W e00
W s W s00
W s00
01 2.12 34.21 21.73 0.83 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.08
10 2.12 34.21 21.73 0.83 -0.21 0.23 0.03 0.08
Table 3: Wefare gain from Training: Sensitivity Analysis I
 ps=pu scnp scnw scnf
W f W f00
W f00
Ww  Ww00
Ww00
W e W e00
W e00
W s W s00
W s00
01 2.25 40.77 23.81 0.89 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.09
10 2.25 40.77 23.81 0.89 -0.20 0.25 0.04 0.09
01 2.50 53.48 27.86 1.00 0.14 0.05 0.09 0.10
10 2.50 53.48 27.86 1.00 -0.18 0.27 0.06 0.10
Table 4: Wefare gain from Training: Sensitivity Analysis II
 b scnp scnw scnf
W f W f00
W f00
Ww  Ww00
Ww00
W e W e00
W e00
W s W s00
W s00
01 0.40 34.21 21.73 0.83 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.08
10 0.40 34.21 21.73 0.83 -0.21 0.23 0.03 0.08
01 0.45 35.61 21.51 0.81 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.09
10 0.45 35.61 21.51 0.81 -0.21 0.22 0.04 0.09
01 0.50 37.01 21.29 0.79 0.13 0.03 0.07 0.10
10 0.50 37.01 21.29 0.79 -0.21 0.20 0.04 0.10
Table 5: Skill Premium and Poductivity Ratios
Skill Premium
ps=pu  = 0  6= 0
2.12 1.50 1.00
2.25 1.56 1.00
2.50 1.67 1.00
Table 6: Skill premium and Unemployment Benets
Skill Premium
b  = 0  6= 0
0.40 1.50 1.00
0.45 1.47 1.00
0.50 1.45 1.00
Table 7: Job Training and Income Inequality
 ps=pu gini
00 2.12 0.38
01 2.12 0.40
10 2.12 0.45
00 2.25 0.39
01 2.25 0.41
10 2.25 0.45
00 2.50 0.40
01 2.50 0.42
10 2.50 0.47
Table 8: Job Training and Income Inequality
 b gini
00 0.40 0.38
01 0.40 0.40
10 0.40 0.45
00 0.45 0.37
01 0.45 0.38
10 0.45 0.43
00 0.50 0.36
01 0.50 0.37
10 0.50 0.41
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